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ESSAY

Reclaiming the Canvassing Board:
Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of
Local Government
RICHARD C. SCHRAGGERt
INTRODUCTION

For many, the most enduring images from the
presidential election debacle of 2000 were the individual
members of county canvassing boards seated at tables set
up in gymnasiums, school auditoriums, and wherever else
there was room, peering quizzically up at disputed punchcard ballots, looking for a glimmer of light behind those
pieces of cardboard. The hanging chad became a running
joke, a symbol of everything that was wrong with a process
that had been badly bungled and was now running amok,
and which was irretrievably corrupt. The skepticism that
met the canvassing boards was ferocious. Indeed, to many
around the country-whether in favor of or against
recounting, whether Democrat or Republican-the pictures
of individuals sitting at card tables in gymnasiums trying to
t Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Visiting
Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to
Rachel Barkow, Jerry Frug, Myriam Gilles, Risa Goluboff, Beth Hillman, Gia
Lee, Richard Primus, Roy Schotland, and Mark Tushnet for their comments on
previous drafts, and to the participants in the Georgetown University Law
Center's Faculty Research Workshop for their invaluable insights.
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decipher punch-card ballots were simply not consistent with
their vision of American democracy at work. The
canvassing boards' seemingly Sisyphean undertaking made
a mockery of the franchise and a laughingstock, some said,
of the United States.'
The heroic counter-image barely made it to the surface.
This image, of canvassing board members and their staffs
taking an oath to uphold the constitutions of Florida and
the United States before sitting down next to their
neighbors to do the work of democracy, was not widely
embraced. Even supporters of Vice President Al Gore held
their noses, begging America's indulgence and patience for
the "messy" but "necessary" work of hand counting
thousands of disputed ballots.2 Very few viewed the
canvassing boards as a glorious example of local governance
at work, as-in fact-the very ideal of local participatory
democracy. And fewer still expressed any confidence in the
competence of the individual members of the boards. These
individuals were not experts, national or state political
leaders, or television personalities, but rather "everyday"
folks who were involved in politics at what is arguably the
most local and least glamorous level possible-the county
canvassing board.
There is an irony here, in a country that so often takes
pride in local self-governance, and whose politicians
regularly deploy the rhetoric of local control. That rhetoric
masks a deep ambivalence, a romantic vision of participatory democracy in small-scale settings accompanied by a
mistrust of local officials and a suspicion that local power is
often abused. This Essay examines how we arrived at a

1. See, e.g., Hoda Elemary, Appeal to Democrats: Gore Must Concede for the
Country's Sake, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A21, available at 2000 WL
4171364; Places Where a Ballot Means Something, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 1, 2001,
at A10; Roger Simon, Eye on the Prize: A Historic Fight to Decide Who's Got the
Votes and Which Ones Count, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 27, 2000, at 2728, available at 2000 WL 29541926; Broward Officials Want Students to Try
Hacking Mock Election, Aug. 16, 2001, http://www.newsjournalonline.com/2001/Aug/17/P0L002.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
2. See Dan Balz, Bush Authorizes Seeking Court Order to Stop Fla. Counties'
Hand Recounts, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL
25427645; Ron Fournier, PresidentialElection Tumbles into Courts, Nov. 13,
2000, availableat http://www.nctimes.com/news/l11400/s.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2002).
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state of affairs where local governance is everywhere
acclaimed and nowhere trusted.
More specifically, this Essay uses Bush v. Gore-the
U.S. Supreme Court decision that effectively resolved the
2000 presidential election-as an opportunity to focus
attention on the role of local institutions in our
constitutional democracy, a discussion that few have
undertaken in the aftermath of that case though it was
centrally concerned with the powers of local entities! The
2000 presidential election-with county canvassing boards
at the center-gives us an opportunity to examine local
government as both a formal political institution and as a
site for democratic practice. I offer the canvassing board as
an archetype (if not an ideal) of localism: first, as
representative of a local political community, be it a town,
city, school district or, as in this case, a county; and second,
as an exemplar of a local institution staffed by "ordinary
people"-be it the planning board, the school board, the
town council or, as here, the canvassing board.
I am interested in how these local institutions are
treated as a formal doctrinal matter and what that says
about the current state of our democratic practice. My
initial claim is that Bush v. Gore is a vivid example of what
Joan Williams has called the "constitutional vulnerability"
of local government.5 Local political entities like counties
are "vulnerable" to the extent that their constitutional
status is ambiguous.! Because local governments have no
clearly defined role in the constitutional scheme, courts
have few constraints (and little guidance) when faced with
questions concerning the distribution of power between
local and state or federal institutions. The result has been a
constitutional "doctrine" that treats localities as mere
creatures of the state with no independent federal
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
4. There has been an understandable avalanche of commentary on Bush v.
Gore. A small sampling includes: THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ,

2000 (2001);

SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION

RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE

2000

ELECTION,

THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET. AL., WHEN
ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF

2000 (2001);

THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF

2000 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).

5. See Joan C. Williams, The ConstitutionalVulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politicsof City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83.
6. See id. at 152.
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constitutional role, and an alternative "shadow doctrine"
that treats localities as sovereign political entities entitled
to constitutional protection. The emergent local government
jurisprudence oscillates between distrust and trust of local
governments depending on whether the exercise of local
power is consistent with some substantive (political) end.
This doctrinal uncertainty points toward a deeper vulnerability-however, a political culture that is increasingly
alienated from governance generally, and from local
government in particular. I wonder why the counties and
the county canvassing boards were not considered
appropriate sites for resolving the 2000 presidential
election, and what that says about current conceptions of
democratic government. I am thinking here again of how
images of the Florida county canvassing boards at work in
their gymnasiums reflect both elite and popular conceptions
of self-government-how they map the "cultural terrain" of
democratic practice.! Local governance is not only
doctrinally untethered; I suggest that it is politically and
culturally untethered as well. If Bush v. Gore indicates
some deficiency in the institutions of American democracy,
as many have suggested, the defect may not be in our
national institutions, but rather in the marginalization of
our local ones.
In critiquing the majority decision in Bush v. Gore, this
Essay does not retell a suitably exasperated story about
how a Supreme Court that has made federalism its central
value suddenly discovered the Equal Protection Clause. The
"Federalist Five,"8 I argue, are no more responsive to
localism than are those on the Court with a more expansive
7. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 697
(2001). Pildes defines democratic practice as "the institutional structures of
democracy with which we live, the legal framework of national democratic
practices, and the dispositions of judges and many others toward novel or
received forms of democratic practice." Id. at 717.
8.The Supreme Court Justices who vote heavily in favor of states rights
"when state interests conflict with an individual citizen's claim of a federal
right" have been called the "Federalist Five." Ann Althouse, The FederalistFive,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 46 (naming Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy as comprising the five-member "federalist"
majority prior to White's retirement); see also Betsy McCaughey Ross, New
Support for States Rights: The Conflict Between Federalism and Equal
Protection Is the Defining Issue of Important Cases Now Before the Supreme
Court, AM. OUTLOOK, Winter 2000, at 44, 45 (listing Justice Thomas as a
member of the "Federalist Five").
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understanding of the Commerce Clause. In fact, federalism
often works at cross purposes with a substantive localism,
and the Equal Protection Clause can be employed to defend
local governance as much as to override it. This Essay seeks
to rehabilitate the county canvassing boards in a different
way, by suggesting where localism fits within a federal
scheme that has been mostly inattentive to the status of
local government. The effort may not make heroes of the
county canvassing boards of Florida or anywhere else, but it
raises new questions about the role of local institutions in a
constitutional democracy.
Part I of this Essay observes how Bush v. Gore reflects
a legal culture that is ambivalent about local government,
how that ambivalence has been translated into
constitutional doctrine, and how that doctrine is deployed
toward the Court's desired result. By claiming that the
decision was "results oriented," I do not mean to express an
opinion about the motivations of the Justices. I will leave it
to others to determine whether the majority of Justices on
the Supreme Court were motivated by partisan political
desires, an institutional concern to avoid a constitutional
crisis, or a genuine belief that particular constitutional
norms mandated intervention. The thesis of constitutional
vulnerability presumes that local government status is
deployed in the service of larger political values or goals.9
What I am interested in is how the Court treated counties
and their canvassing boards and to what end.
Part II challenges the assertion that the Rehnquist
Court's federalism jurisprudence is protective of local
government. In fact, localism and federalism are often
incompatible. In Bush v. Gore, they are on opposite sides.
Part III concludes with some observations about the
current thinness of our conceptions of self-government. I
suggest several reasons why local institutions are not
9. Whether these goals are characterized as "high politics," which "involves
struggles over competing values and ideologies," or as "low politics," which
"involves struggles over which group or party will hold power," Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1045, 1062-64 (2001), is not my concern. In any case, the thesis of local
government vulnerability shows how difficult it is to disentangle "high" from
"low" politics. As Joan Williams has shown, local government status has
historically been manipulated in the interests of specific political forces (for
example, property owners) in the name of larger ideologies (for example, the
market). See Williams, supra note 5, at 87-138; infra Part I.C.

398

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

considered relevant institutional checks on the "rule by
nine," drawing connections between the Court's treatment
of the county canvassing boards and scholars' recent
concerns about the state of civil society. The conclusion to
be drawn from Bush v. Gore is not that the Court
manipulated local government status toward a desired
end-that is far from unusual. Rather, the real lesson may
be that we allowed the Court to do so.
I.

TRUST AND DISTRUST

I begin with the obvious but overlooked observation
that the Supreme Court was bound by the institutional
geography of voting in Florida. Counties and county
canvassing boards-the most local of local institutionswere the origins of the presidential election dispute. Florida
is divided into over sixty counties, independent political
entities that govern through elected county commissioners.
Under Florida law at the time of the 2000 presidential
election, county canvassing boards were composed of three
officials: the county Supervisor of Elections, a county court
judge, and the chair of the board of county commissioners."
The canvassing boards oversaw the work of county election
boards, composed of inspectors and clerks, who were
required to be residents of the county.1 The canvassing
boards were charged with transmitting 12the countywide
returns to the Florida Department of State.
It is easy to forget that an election dispute that was
eventually reduced to the two candidates' names-George
W. Bush and Al Gore-began with a lawsuit pitting county
canvassing boards against the Florida Secretary of State.
The Palm Beach and Volusia County canvassing boards
sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring that the
10. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(1) (West 1982). But see Florida Election
Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 2001-40 (West) (amending FLA.
STAT.

§ 102.141).

11. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.012(1) (West 1982) (making the county supervisor
of elections of the county canvassing board "responsible for the attendance and
diligent performance" of each clerk and inspector); id. § 102.012 (2) (West Supp.
2001) (mandating that inspectors and clerks of the election board "be a
registered qualified elector of the county in which the member is appointed").
But see Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 2001-40
(West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 102.012).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(6) (West Supp. 2001). But see 2001 Fla. Sess.
Law. Serv. 2001-40 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 102.141).
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Florida Secretary of State certify their recounted election
returns even if those returns were submitted beyond the
statutory deadline.13 The initial issue then was the
distribution of authority between a state official acting
through a state office, and local officials acting through
local offices. A state circuit court judge ruled that the
Secretary was not required to accept late returns.14 That
decision was overruled by the Florida Supreme Court,
which held that the Secretary of State was required to
accept amended election returns even after the statutory
deadline unless doing so would undermine the integrity of
the electoral system.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, remanded the case
to the Florida Supreme Court, requesting that the Florida
court clarify its ruling in light of the fact that federal power
plays a role in presidential elections pursuant to Article II
6 In essence, the Supreme Court
of the U.S. Constitution."
was introducing another level of government, reminding the
Florida Supreme Court that it had to consider the
appropriate distribution of authority among state, local,
and federal institutions and warning that it-the U.S.
Supreme Court-would do so as well on appeal. 7
It is against this backdrop of the institutional
distribution of powers that the debate over the standards
for counting disputed ballots in Florida took place. The role
of local institutions was therefore squarely at issue in Bush
v. Gore. The Court's treatment of those institutions says a
great deal about the uneasy constitutional status of local
government. Indeed, the equal protection argument at the
heart of the majority opinion is emblematic of this status.

13. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000), rev'd sub nom. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.
2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
14. McDermott, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1.
15. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at1239-40.
16. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78. The Court also noted the possible application of 3
U.S.C. § 5 (1994), the federal statute that provides a "safe harbor" for a state
"insofar as consideration of its electoral votes is concerned." Id.
17. See id. ("[A]mbiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not
stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the
federal constitution of state action.") (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
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A. Equal Protectionand Local Discretion
The equal protection claim that pitted the Florida
Supreme Court against the U.S. Supreme Court was
fundamentally about the exercise of local power. Recall that
the majority in Bush v. Gore held that the recounts ordered
by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the Florida court failed to provide a specific
standard for counting disputed ballots. 8 The core of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision was that the Florida
Supreme Court's instruction to the canvassing boards to
determine "the intent of the voter" did not "satisfy the
minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of
voters necessary to secure the fundamental right." 9 At oral
argument," and in the subsequent opinion, the Justices
repeatedly expressed their concern that the Florida
Supreme Court had failed to provide sufficient guidance to
local boards in deciding whether disputed ballots could be
counted and for whom: "The problem inheres in the absence
of specific standards to ensure its equal application."' As
the Court stated with some exasperation: "[T]he standards
for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not
only from county to county but indeed within a single
county from one recount team to another."2
The overriding concern of the Bush v. Gore majority
was the exercise of standardless discretion by county
canvassing boards. Of course, the Florida Supreme Court's
"intent of the voter" standard did not come out of thin air: it
had ample precedent in state case law and statutory
provisions, and it embodied a state constitutional value that
encouraged the counting of all possible votes. 3 For the
18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 105.
20. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00949), at 2000 WL 1804429.
21. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106.
22. Id.
23. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.011(2) (West 1982) (indicating that paper
ballots not properly marked with an "X" may nevertheless be valid "so long as
there is a clear indication... that the person marking such ballot has made a
definite choice"); id. § 101.5614(5) (damaged ballots that cannot be counted by
tabulating machines shall be counted manually, and may not be voided if the
canvassing board is able to determine the intent of the voters); see also Fla. ex
rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940) (ruling that a nonconforming
marking on the ballot should have been counted because it was clear whom the
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majority of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, however, the lack
of a uniform standard for counting disputed ballots was an
obvious equal protection problem. Counting ballots with
hanging or indented chads in one county while throwing
them out in another was per se unequal treatment.
Partisan tendencies alone do not seem to account for
these radically different understandings of the most
fundamental requirements of equal protection. Two of the
more vociferous dissenters from the majority opinion in the
U.S. Supreme Court-Justices Breyer and Souter-joined
the majority in condemning the lack of guidance provided
by the Florida Supreme Court to the counters (though they
rejected the majority's remedy).24 And it seems unlikely that
the Florida Supreme Court would simply adopt a vague
standard knowing full well that it could not possibly
comport with equal protection, or that the two Justices who
did not find an equal protection violation-Ginsburg and
Stevens-could possibly be so outside the mainstream and
so cavalier about the standard for counting votes.25
Differing conceptions of local institutional role provide a
better explanation. Had the Florida Supreme Court
declared that, for example, indented Broward County
ballots should be counted but indented Miami-Dade County
ballots should not be, the equal protection problem would be
obvious. But the Florida Supreme Court never adopted a
non-uniform standard. Instead of dictating the specifics of
the "intent of the voter" standard-which would have been
tantamount to counting the disputed ballots themselvesthe Florida Supreme Court simply shifted decision-making
to the canvassing boards.26 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme
Court required that canvassing boards be provided with
voter intended to vote for). But see Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001
Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 2001-40 (West) (repealing FLA. STAT. § 101.011 and
amending § 101.5614).
24. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 134 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that Florida Supreme
Court's ruling did not violate the Constitution for want of providing a more
precise standard for counting contested ballots); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that total accuracy in a recount is not always possible and
that flawed methods may still yield fair results).
26. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253-55 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)
(holding that final results of the statewide election should not be issued, when
properly contested, until all legal votes have been considered), rev'd sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

402

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

fairly specific instructions on how to count disputed
ballots-equal treatment requires uniformity throughout
the state. The Florida court's "intent of the voter" standard
was at the opposite extreme: a general instruction
effectively to "do the right thing" when exercising one's
discretion.
This "do the right thing" standard only makes sense if
one views counties and their canvassing boards as active
and important players in the electoral regime, instead of as
passive mechanisms for instituting the state's will. If
counties are trustworthy repositories of power, the decision
to leave substantial discretion to county representatives
seems quite reasonable, and even required. The county
canvassing boards should make determinations about
disputed ballots because that is theirjob. Localities manage
elections and can manage the details of counting, especially
the details of counting the small percentage of ballots that
fall into the "disputed" category.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, made an argument
along these lines., As Stevens pointed out, the canvassing
board is akin to another local deliberative institution
populated by "ordinary citizens" that we also trust to
implement broad standards under difficult factual
circumstances-the jury.27 Justice Stevens wrote,
[Tihere is no reason to think that the guidance provided to the
factfinders, specifically the various canvassing boards, by the
"intent of the voter" standard is any less sufficient-or will lead to
results any less uniform-than, for example, the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard employed 2 8 everyday by ordinary
citizens in courtrooms across this country.

Justice Stevens evoked the jury to counter the
suggestion that "intent of the voter" is too vague a standard
for a canvassing board to apply. The stronger claim implicit
in Stevens's analogy is one about the proper role of the
canvassing board. On this argument, the adoption of a more
rigorous standard by the Florida Supreme Court would
have been inconsistent with the local management of
elections, the proper division of labor. In other words, it
would be just as improper to tell a canvassing board that it
must find the intent of a voter under a particular set of
27. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
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facts as it would be to tell a jury that it must find the intent
of a criminal defendant under a particular set of facts. We
seek to preserve the jury's role as factfinder (despite our
ambivalence about it) because there are affirmative
substantive values to that form of decision-making.
Canvassing boards, like juries, are the appropriate sites for
investing the kind of judgment required to make hard
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, because the
reasoning that ordinary citizens bring to the table is
valuable, and because such local decision-making is more
consistent with, and protective of, our democratic values.
Of course, Stevens's analogy to the jury begs two kinds
of questions concerning the relative trustworthiness of local
entities. The first is a question of institutional competence-can local governments do a good job? The second
is a question of institutional power-will local governments
do a good job? These two questions are often conflated; local
entities are often distrusted as possible sites for a
substantive institutional role because their competence is
suspect. I examine each in turn.
B. Local Virtue and Vice
The first question-of institutional competence-is one
that dogs all institutions staffed with "ordinary citizens."
The analogy between juries and local governments is an
instructive one. A long history and an extensive literaturepopular and legal-reflects the myth and sometime reality
that juries act stupidly or incompetently. Jury reformers
suggest that complex cases are beyond the reach of the
ordinary citizen, that juries often do not follow the law, that
juries make decisions on prejudice or whim, that juries tend
to be populated by less intelligent people, or that juries
cannot properly make difficult decisions about causation or
damages .29
29. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849 (1998) ("Juries have been said,
variously, to be incompetent, capricious, unreliable, biased, sympathy-prone,
confused, hostile to corporate defendants and doctors, gullible, excessively
generous in awarding compensatory damages, and out of control when
awarding punitive damages."). Reviews of these criticisms are contained in
Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306 (Robert Litan ed., 1993); STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); NEIL VIDMAR,
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Local government institutions are susceptible to similar

charges of incompetence. As Alexis de Tocqueville-the
champion of local government-admitted, people acting
through local institutions will sometimes conduct public
business very poorly." Local officials, according to John
Stuart Mill, often bring "inferior qualifications" to their
tasks and answer to "inferior public opinion."" The realityas Mill recognized in the nineteenth century-is that local
government is not normally an attractive career choice for
professionals and those with expertise who can opt for
positions at the state or federal level. The pay is less, the
rewards fewer, the impact less significant and often
marginal. Local governments are often staffed by part-time
employees, or by non-professionals. The "best and the
brightest" may be too busy and too focused on more national
issues to bother themselves with the parochial concerns of
the town planning board or sewer authority or library
committee. The standard refrain is that municipal
institutions are not managed by those "best fitted by their
intelligence, business experience, capacity, and moral
character," and their management is "too often both unwise
32
and extravagant."
Of course, there are counter-arguments. For example,
local officials may be more responsive to local concerns,
more accountable, and more aware of local circumstances,
and therefore better able to serve the interests of local
citizens. Like the jury, local entities may bring much
needed commonsense and local knowledge to particular
kinds of decision-making, and decisions may be viewed as
more legitimate when arrived at through local processes.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS
ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS

(1995); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1093, 1109-15 (1996); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Stephen L. Daniels, The
Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols,
Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building (Is the Jury Competent?), 52 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 269 (1989).
30. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 74-75 (Henry
Reeve trans., Shoken Books 2d ed. 1961) (1835).
31. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY,
REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 387 (H.B. Acton ed., 1987) (1910).
32. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 85-86 (2d ed.,
rev. New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1873).
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Indeed, localities may be better positioned to achieve local
ends than centralized, distant governments.
This brings us to the second question of institutional
role-whether local governments are appropriate sites for
the exercise of political power. The issue of power is more
problematic because it evokes far deeper concerns. Local
governments may act incompetently sometimes, but our
real concern is whether local governments will act venally
or corruptly.
Whether one believes that local institutions will act
venally is inextricable from one's theory of democratic
government. Political theory is interested in questions
about the relationship between democracy and scale. One
tradition posits small-scale localities as repositories of
republican virtue. Various versions of this account link
localism with citizenship-from Jefferson's yeoman farmers
governing themselves in wards to New Englanders
governing themselves through the traditional town
meeting. These accounts share with de Tocqueville the view
that the strength of a free nation resides in the local
community. Local institutions are "to liberty what primary
schools are to science; they bring it within people's reach,
they teach people how to use and enjoy it."3 Without local
institutions, "a nation may establish free government,...
but it cannot have the spirit of liberty."34 On this account,
self-government in localized, participatory settings serves
as an antidote to corruption and despotism. Large-scale
government threatens the values of independence,
judgment, self-rule, and citizenship.
Those suspicious of local power can invoke an equally
powerful counter-tradition, citing James Madison's familiar
discussion of factions in Federalist No. 10." Madison's
argument to "extend the sphere" is the basis for the
expansive American republic. Madison theorized that
tyrannous majorities can more easily gain power in a polity
consisting of a small number of citizens. His is an argument
about territorial and political scale. To control the problem
of faction, you enlarge the territory and persons

33. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 55.
34. Id.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62-64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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encompassed by the political unit-by "extending the
sphere," a republic can counter the danger of faction."
The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists did battle over
these questions of scale in the early days of the republic.37
The current debate tends to revolve around competing
accounts of the constraints on local government behavior.
Devotees of Madison claim that local governments will often
be susceptible to dominance by stable local majority
factions or to capture by vocal and well-organized minority
factions, and that local government will be characterized by
"majoritarian excess" on the one hand or by interest group
domination on the other. Taking the opposite view,
proponents of local government trustworthiness argue that
localities are actually less likely than large-scale polities to
suffer the vices of majoritarian excess or interest group
factionalism. That is because power is more accessible and
less costly to obtain in a small-scale republic. Therefore,
minority residents and firms are more likely to get
themselves heard by local governors than by state or
national ones. More important, unsatisfied local residents
or firms can easily leave a small-scale jurisdiction for a
more amenable one if they do not like how things are being
run. These constraints of "voice" and "exit" discipline smallscale jurisdictions to be attentive both to stable inattentive
majorities and to minority concerns. 9 Those constraints are
greatly weakened at the state or federal level.
The counties and county canvassing boards of Florida
look very different depending on which side of local virtue
or vice one is on. If one views the local canvassing boards as
Jeffersonian repositories of republican virtue, or as
institutions properly scaled to avoid the problems of faction,
then it would be inappropriate to impose on them standards
for counting their own votes-first, because we can trust
them more than a centralized government to act virtuously
36. See id.
37. See Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire:
Anti-Federalismfrom the Attack on "Monarchism"to Modern Localism, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 74, 99 (1990).
38. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND POLITICS

7, 284, 298-99, 322-24 (1995).

39. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105

1032-39 (1996) (book review). See generally ALBERT 0.

YALE

AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,

(1970).

L.J. 1121,

HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND STATES
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(or at least not venally); and second, because selfgovernment in localized settings benefits democracy as a
whole. Alternatively, if one sees counties and county
canvassing boards as sites of Madisonian faction (or as
scaled to be captured by them easily), then it is correct to
limit their discretion; otherwise, they will likely use it to
oppress a minority.
C. The ConstitutionalStatus of Local Government
The doctrine and "shadow doctrine" of local government
status parallels these two accounts of the nature of smallscaled political institutions. To the extent that local
governments are distrusted, they are treated as nonentities-administrative units of the state in which they
happen to be found. This is the formal doctrine of local
government status. To the extent that local governments"
are trusted, they are treated as sovereigns, political
communities with independent and valued constitutional
roles. This is the "shadow doctrine" of local government
status.
Distrust of local entities is consistent with the formal
doctrine that local governments have no constitutional
status. Counties and their canvassing boards are all
creatures of the state-they can be created, modified, and
eliminated at the will of the state legislature. Justice Moody
put the point quite forcefully in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them....
Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental
powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental
purposes, or authorizing them to hold or mange such property, or
exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with
the State within the meaning of the Federal Constitution....
[Tihe State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its
action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained
by
40
any provision of the Constitution of the United States.

40. 207 U.S. 161, 164 (1907); see also Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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The doctrine of state legislative supremacy has
remained the conventional wisdom. 4' A corollary to the
constitutional doctrine of legislative supremacy is the rule
that state enabling statutes-the laws that confer powers
on local governments-should be strictly construed.4 ' At the
time he articulated the rule in 1872, John Dillon-the
"most famous nineteenth-century scholar of municipal
governance""4 -sought to limit municipal power, particularly municipal authority to regulate private property. 4
Dillon's fear of municipal corporations stemmed from his
distrust of the use of public funds to underwrite public
works projects, like railroads, "which are better left to
private capital." 45 Municipalities had to be limited in their
authority to purely public matters to prevent them from
interfering with private property and the "natural
functioning of the market system." "Dillon's Rule" limits
municipal power to the explicit terms of the legislative
grant.
The formal doctrine of distrust and Dillon's Rule does
not exhaust the constitutional treatment of local
government status, however. A competing "shadow
doctrine" of local government status treats localities as
having some of the characteristics of soViereignty. On this
account, local entities-in this case, counties-are more
than convenient jurisdictional units, but Actually represent
independent and robust political communities, worthy of
constitutional recognition. Local political units are not mere
instrumentalities of the state, they are autonomous actors
with broad powers to set local policy.
This quasi-constitutional doctrine of local sovereignty
finds expression in a number of cases involving the primary
powers of local governments to regulate land use, control
local finances, and administer local public schools. Thus, as
Carol Rose observes, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
41. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978)
(quoting Hunter and noting that state legislatures can decide the political reach
of local governments).
42. See 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS

448-55 (5th ed. 1911).

43. David Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism,147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 506 (1999).
44. See id. at 506-08; Williams, supra note 5, at 95-100.
45. Williams, supra note 5, at 94-95 (discussing Dillon's view of local power).
46. Id. at 97 (noting that Dillon's view of local power stemmed from his
conception of "the requirements of laissez-faire economics").
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which upheld the power of local governments to deploy
restrictive zoning ordinances, "gave back, under land use
auspices,
the local authority supposedly taken away by
Dillon's,,41
Dillon's [Rule] . Other commentators have also recognized
a local "quasi constitutional principle of self rule.' In a
series of land use cases after Euclid, the Court has shown a
pattern of deference to local government decision-making
and has widened the scope of local police powers.
These decisions do not merely reflect deference to state
choices to organize their local jurisdictional boundaries as
they see fit, but rather embody an independent value of
local control-an assertion that communities should be
empowered to choose policies consonant with local valuesthat can be deployed to counter federal interference. Thus,
in cases like Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ° Arlington
Heights v. Metro HousingDevelopment Corp., 1and Warth v.

47. Rose, supra note 37, at 99 (discussing Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). In
addition, the home rule movement resulted in states adopting constitutional
protections for localities beginning as early as 1875. See generally Michael E.
Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism,64 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1989).
48. Williams, supra note 5, at 83 n.2; see also M. David Gelfand, The Burger
Court and the New Federalism:Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local
Government Actors in the PoliticalDramas of the 1980s, 21 B.C. L. REV. 763,
837, 847 (1980); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS:
How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE,
AND LAND-USE POLICIES 216 (2001) ("With the Court's approval of zoning,
Dillon's view of municipalities was implicitly ousted in favor of Cooley's
[inherent right of local self-government].").
49. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 139-43 (1971) (holding that
absent showing of racial discrimination, requirement that all low-rent public
housing projects must be approved by a majority of voters does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974)
(holding that zoning ordinance excluding student households withstands
"rational basis" test); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508-18 (1975) (holding that
residents, nonresidents, and organizations do not have standing to sue for
remedy of exclusionary zoning); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
426 U.S. 668, 670-80 (1976) (holding that provision in city charter providing
that any changes in land use agreed to by City Council must be approved by
majority vote in a referendum does not violate due process); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding a zoning ordinance
restricting the location of new theaters showing sexually explicit movies);
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (holding
that plaintiff with standing to sue had no remedy for exclusionary zoning under
the Fourteenth Amendment because village's discriminatory "purpose" not
adequately proven).
50. 416 U.S. at 8-9.
51. 429 U.S. at 270.
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Seldin52 the Court adopted expansive language limiting the
ability of (usually poor and minority) outsiders to employ
federal constitutional guarantees to challenge local
exclusionary land use policies. Instead of treating residents
and non-residents as citizens of the same state who
happened to be divided into local administrative units, the
Court treated residents as insiders of an identifiable
political community, one that could exclude outsiders on the
basis of self-governance. The question, as the Court saw it,
was not whether states were entitled to set up
administrative subunits that could use state-granted
powers to prevent other members of the political
community from moving there, but rather whether local
communities could make independent choices to adopt
particular versions of the "decent life"" when those
decisions happened to have "incidental" effects on
outsiders.5 The answer for the Court-once local political
autonomy was assumed-was obvious.
Local autonomy limits federal scrutiny of local values,
in particular, scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The Court's busing and school
finance cases provide an even more robust version of this
principle of self-rule. For example, in San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, the Court rejected a challenge to
a Texas school financing regime based on local property
taxes.55 Despite the fact that the financing scheme was
imposed by the state, the Court rejected an equal protection
claim challenging the significant disparities in school
funding between local districts on the basis that fiscal
differentials among counties were not susceptible to equal
protection analysis.56 The Court stated that it lacked the
ability to make "wise decisions with respect to the raising
52. 422 U.S. at 508-18.
53. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 87 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); see also Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389
(1926) ("ITIhe village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a
separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as
it sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the state and
federal Constitutions. Its governing authorities, presumably representing a
majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will, have determined, not that
industrial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of such
development shall proceed with definitely fixed lines.").
54. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 506.
55. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
56. See id. at 41.
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and disposition of public revenues," concluding that "[i]n
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist,
the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of
scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of
criticism under the Equal Protection Clause." 7
Similarly in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court struck down
a federal district court's school desegregation order that
mandated busing across county lines. In invalidating the
metropolitan area-wide remedy, Chief Justice Burger
described a constitutionally recognizable place for local
autonomy: "No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and to the quality of the educational
process."59 The district court's remedy viewed the practice of
educating Michigan school children in separate school
districts as an administrative convenience, and one that
should fall to the requirements of integration." For the
district court, it was as if the state established an agency
that employed arbitrary geographic criteria in allotting
students to schools (and distributed resources according to
those criteria). School district boundaries had no
independent significance, except as jurisdictional markers,
and therefore had little relevance when equal protection
norms were at stake. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding
that local jurisdictional lines had an independent value in
protecting local prerogatives-prerogatives with a long and
significant pedigree of functioning independently of
national power.6 Local power thus emerges as a means of
limiting federal judicial interference.

57. Id. But cf Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (holding that the
state's unequal allocation of federal grant lands to local school districts might
raise an equal protection problem).
58. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
59. Id. at 741-42.
60. See id. at 741.
61. Id. at 741-42; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98-100 (1995)
(invalidating a district court's school desegregation remedy that required the
state to continue funding remedial education programs and stating that the
court should seek to restore local control of schools); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[L]ocal autonomy of school districts is a
vital national tradition.").

412

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

D. The Demise and Resurrectionof Local Control
Both the formal doctrine of constitutional distrust and
the shadow doctrine of constitutional trust are at work in
Bush v. Gore. If counties are instrumentalities of the state
with no independent sovereign status, it is perfectly correct
to hold Florida accountable for the arbitrariness of local
vote-counting." If counties are instrumentalities of the
state, then the relevant question for equal protection
analysis is whether the state can create territorial
designations that employ widely divergent standards for
counting votes in a state-wide election. It is as if the state
created a vote counting agency that determined that
disputed votes would be treated differently according to
arbitrary jurisdictional lines. The state and its adopted
standard are the focus of constitutional inquiry-what
matters is the state acting through its counties and
canvassing boards, not the counties and canvassing boards
themselves.
Indeed, whether canvassing boards behave competently
and virtuously does not matter if they have adopted
different standards; the state would nonetheless have to
provide some rational basis for allowing its convenient
administrative agencies to behave differently from one
another. Even so, the Bush v. Gore majority did appear to
mistrust the vote counters, noting that "county canvassing
boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams comprised
of judges from various Circuits who had no previous
training in handling and interpreting ballots."63 The opinion
also cited record evidence that within some counties, the
applicable standards for counting disputed ballots shifted
from day to day and even from counting table to counting
table, indicating either a problem of competence or
corruption or both. 4 Moreover, though never explicitly
mentioned, venality is certainly implied by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's citation in his concurrence to civil rights era
cases in which the Supreme Court had to reign in the
excesses of southern institutions bent on oppressing

62. Cf Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (holding that
state statute that redefined the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, to
exclude most black voters, was a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
63. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
64. See id. at 106.
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blacks.65 The implication was that localities cannot be
trusted because of some invidious motive-the most
invidious in our history being racism.66 Fear of corruption is
the subtext of the arguments about standards: in the
absence of standards, county canvassing boards dominated
by Democrats-an example of a Madisonian faction-could
"throw" the election to Al Gore, the Democratic candidate.
And yet, the majority was not wholly comfortable with
the implications of treating the Florida counties as mere
instrumentalities. In fact, the majority's equal protection
analysis is indefensible if localities are simply administrative units of the state. If the lack of a uniform standard for
counting votes is an equal protection violation, then the use
by counties of different voting mechanisms-be they paper
ballot, voting machine, or computer-should also constitute
an equal protection violation. It is uncontroverted that
different balloting mechanisms result in serious differences
in the number of votes that are thrown out as irregular
across counties. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the logic of
the equal protection claim should extend to "Florida's
decision to leave to each county the determination of what
balloting system to employ-despite enormous differences
in accuracy,"67 as it should to "the similar decisions of the
vast majority of state legislatures to delegate to local
authorities certain decisions with respect to voting systems
and ballot design." 8 In short, if local standards are
65. See id. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
66. Justice Ginsburg criticized the Chief Justice for this almost cynical use
of Civil Rights era precedents, rejecting the implicit linkage of Florida's
electoral systems with the electoral system of the Jim Crow South. See id. at
140-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. id. at 134 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that local variation in voting mechanisms can be justified
by concerns about cost, innovation, "and so on"). Souter's primary equal
protection concern seemed to be intra-county differential treatment, not intercounty differential treatment. See id.
68. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J. dissenting). These designs led to significant
discrepancies in the percentage of votes rejected as irregular across counties.
Those counties using computer balloting procedures had a small percentage of
ballots thrown out for irregularities, while those counties employing paper
ballots saw a significant percentage of ballots thrown out as irregular or
unreadable. See id. at 126 n.4. These discrepancies were correlated with race.
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov-

/vote2000/stdraftl/main.htm (finding that African Americans made up only 11%
of the voting population but cast 54% of the ballots rejected in automatic
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inadequate for equal protection purposes on a recount, then
local mechanisms should be even more inadequate when
the state makes affirmative choices to delegate electoral
regimes to local entities from the start.
The "shadow doctrine" of local government status,
however, emerges to preserve a core of local control. Just as
the Rodriguez Court was not prepared to say that all "local
fiscal schemes"-i.e., all cross county differences in school
funding-are suspect,69 the Bush v. Gore majority was not
prepared to say that all local counting regimes-i.e., all
cross county differences in vote counting-are suspect.
Local control of voting is a long-standing tradition; like local
control of education, it has an independent constitutional
value. Thus, according to the majority,
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the
exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for
implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation
where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has
70
ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.

With these two sentences, counties (and their canvassing
boards), "local entities," are quickly put to the side with
their baseline powers intact. Suddenly local entities do have
a role in the system; they are not merely instruments of the
state.
This appears to be something of a turnabout: whereas
the Court was quite skeptical of the ability of localities to
implement the intent of the voter standard, local entities
now have "expertise" that they may "exercise." This may
account for the Court's resistance to a no-holds-barred
portrayal of local institutions as untrustworthy, as hotbeds
of Madisonian tyranny and all the rest. The Court was
quite careful not to attribute specific venal motives to the
county canvassing boards, and indeed, there was no finding
of corruption or fraud in the record. Instead, the Court's
skepticism was reserved for the Florida Supreme Court,

machine counts). But cf.

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 308 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that

punch-card systems did not dominate in Democratic counties and that 60.4% of
white voters and 63.1% of black voters lived in punch-card balloting counties).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
70. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
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and its rhetoric was sometimes protective of the canvassing
boards.
It was not that the canvassing boards could not be
trusted, but that "[wihen a court orders a statewide remedy,
there must be at least some assurance that the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied."71 The thrust of the
majority opinion was clearly directed to the state court, not
to counties or canvassing boards per se. In other words, the
Court treated as obvious that local entities can develop
different systems for implementing elections. Thus, the
Court left intact balloting systems that led to vast
disparities across counties in the number of irregular or
unreadable ballots thrown out. Yet, it compelled the state to
adopt rigorous standards when it required a locality to
perform a recount. The Court assumed some a priori local
sovereignty over elections; it is only after a recount is
ordered that the state gains the "power to assure
uniformity." The phrase "power to assure uniformity,"
however, makes no sense at all if localities are
instrumentalities of the state. If the local entity is an
instrumentality of the state, the state has always had the
power to assure uniformity; it does not "gain" that power
after a recount is ordered.
Is the locality a sovereign or an instrumentality when it
comes to implementing elections? For the majority, the
answer is both. Local government is both relevant and not
at issue in the case; the obvious sphere of local autonomy to
regulate elections remains untouched. For purposes of
implementing elections, counties are sovereign-local
entities can exercise their expertise in designing voting
mechanisms, whether they use paper ballots or computers,
whether the ballots are counted by machine or by hand.
Indeed, on the sovereign conception, localities should be
permitted to experiment with various voting regimes, as
long as their internal mechanisms comport with equal
protection. Counties are also instrumentalities, howeverwhen ordered by a state to engage in a recount, the state
must articulate rigorous standards to ensure uniformity
across counties. Counties are agencies of the state, and the
state cannot treat the ballots of one agency differently than
it treats the ballots of another agency.
71. Id.
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If counties retain a core of sovereignty, then no
difference in counting procedures (as between counties) is
arbitrary or irrational. Sovereign political units can decide
how to count "their own" citizens' votes, as do states, and
any variance between counties is a result of substantive
political will, not simply arbitrary jurisdictional division. If
counties are instrumentalities, than any difference in
counting procedures appears arbitrary. The votes being
counted are those of the citizens of the state, and
differences based upon random territorial divisions have no
rational basis. By treating counties as both sovereign and
instrumentality, the Court finessed these two extremes.
Moreover, by treating the counties and their canvassing
boards as instrumentalities when ordered by the state's
highest court to engage in a recount, and as sovereigns for
purposes of implementing election regimes, the Court's
opinion protects a limited sphere of local authority. A
locality "acting on its own" has some discretion to exercise
its expertise in implementing elections. A locality acting,
however, on the instructions of the state is subject to
federal oversight. The Court's skepticism-its distrust-is
reserved for the institutions of the state, namely the Florida
Supreme Court.
In this way, the Court resurrected local control over
elections while seeming to reject it altogether. It shifted the
blame for the equal protection violation from the counties to
the state by treating the counties as instrumentalities, and
then rehabilitated the counties by assuming that they were
sovereign within their sphere.
II. FEDERALISM AND LOCALISM
Thus, the real magic in Bush v. Gore is a disappearing
trick: local entities seem to disappear and reappear at will.
The counties and their canvassing boards are "vulnerable"
to this manipulation because they have no set institutional
role in the constitutional scheme. Unlike states, local
political entities have no formal constitutional status. The
malleability of local government status is convenient; it
means that local institutions are readily deployed in the
service of political ends, most often by being treated as
invisible until called in to serve as a check on some
uncongenial exercise of centralized power, sometimes
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directly as in Milliken or Rodriguez, and sometimes as an
afterthought as in Bush v. Gore.
Some might argue that local status is already
adequately addressed in the constitutional scheme through
the vertical separation of powers, and that principles of
federalism are attentive to the requirements of local power.
Often, battles over the proper distribution of powers
between the federal and state sovereigns invoke the
rhetoric of local control and the counter-rhetoric of local
parochialism. On numerous accounts, federalism is the
bulwark of limited government. The vertical separation of
powers is the chief structural component of a constitution
that is meant to check the federal government. States'
rights ensure that the centralized authorities will be
constrained, leaving room for the exercise of "local" power,
which is more accountable and more responsive to the
concerns of the people.73 A contrary account views
federalism
as
synonymous
with
"local" tyranny.
Historically, "states' rights" have been invoked to justify
slavery and Jim Crow; more recently, states' rights have
been used to deny federal protection to victims of sexual
72. While the "shadow doctrine" of local government "visibility" is the most
direct means for limiting federal interference into local matters, the formal
doctrine of local government "invisibility" can also be employed to prevent
federal intervention. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opposition to
municipal liability for constitutional torts relies, in part, on the Hunter doctrine
that municipal corporations are creatures of the state. Cf Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 665 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's decision holding that municipalities do not enjoy qualified
immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations
"impinges seriously on the prerogatives of municipal entities created and
regulated primarily by the States"); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
714-24 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision
holding that municipalities may be held liable for federal constitutional
deprivations because they are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and do not share
the state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
73. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("This federalist
structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages. It
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."). See generally Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10
(1988).
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violence, to prevent federal intervention to control gun
violence, or to remedy violations of federal law by state
actors.74
These are the competing claims, at least. What is lost in
these arguments is the distinction between state and local
government.75 The reality is that, though the themes
sounded by those who favor broader state immunities and
rights are often articulated as a general suspicion of
centralized power, a robust states' rights jurisprudence is
actually quite hostile to a substantive localism. Indeed,
state supremacy within its sphere dictates that localities
should only have the status that states decide they should
have. Thus we should not cry hypocrisy when the Federalist
Five run roughshod over local institutions like county
canvassing boards. Nor should we be surprised when a
significant number of Justices embrace a vigorous version
of state legislative supremacy-a strong version of Dillon's
Rule-that they zealously guard from federal interference
from above and from local interference from below. A
federal constitutional value of state autonomy is simply not
74. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000)
(striking down federal Violence Against Women Act); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997) (striking down portion of federal handgun
registration scheme); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking
down federal "gun free school zones" legislation); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-374 (2001) (holding that by virtue of the
Eleventh Amendment, Congress, in enacting the Americans with Disabilities
Act, lacked power to authorize persons subjected to discrimination by state
agencies on the basis of disability to sue in federal court); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-48
(1999) (holding that Congress is powerless to authorize a federal court suit for
patent infringement brought by a private entity against a state instrumentality
under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (holding that Congress is powerless to authorize a federal court suit for
misleading advertising brought by a private entity against a state
instrumentality under the Lanham Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 66 (2000) (holding that Congress is powerless to authorize federal court
suits for age discrimination brought by private individuals against state
instrumentalities under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999) (holding that Congress is powerless to
authorize a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for overtime brought in a Maine
state court by private individuals against their employer, the state of Maine).
75. This is a distinction that a less federalist-minded Court has recognized.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (holding that
municipalities do not share the state's immunity from lawsuits under the
Eleventh Amendment).
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synonymous with local autonomy; these values are, in fact,
in tension.
A. State Legislative Supremacy in Bush v. Gore
State legislative supremacy is the crux of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush v. Gore.7" Recall that the
Chief Justice joined the majority in its holding that the
intent of the voter standard violated equal protection. His
chief complaint, however, was that the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of the state statutory scheme
departed from the state legislature's intentions, and
therefore violated the U.S. Constitution's provisions for the
election of the President and Vice President.77 At first blush,
this appears to be a radical departure from federalist
principles, which require that federal courts defer to state
courts on disputed matters of state statutory interpretation."8 In fact, Rehnquist's Article II argument (joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas) can be read as a defense of
state power against all comers, including, most emphatically, local power. This reading is actually quite consistent
with the federalist principle of state supremacy within its
sphere.
Rehnquist's argument turned on the fact that the U.S.
Constitution, Article II, section 1 provides that" 'each State
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct' " electors for the President and Vice President."
Had the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the Florida
legislature's instructions-the election statutes-properly,
asserted Rehnquist, there would be no violation of Article
II. The Florida Supreme Court, however, got it wrong. By
extending the certification deadline and by forcing the
Secretary of State to accept late vote counts that included
totals from "improperly marked ballots," the court
"step[ped] away from.., established practice, prescribed by
the Secretary, the state official charged by the legislature
with 'responsibility to... obtain and maintain uniformity
in the application, operation, and interpretation of the

76. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
77. Id. at 114-20.
78. See id. at 136-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art II, §1).

420
election laws.'

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
,,80

[Vol. 50

The court's interpretation of "legal vote,"

and hence its decision to order a contest-period recount, was
a "depart[ure] from the legislative scheme."8'
The problem with the Florida Supreme Court's decision,
according to Rehnquist, was that by forcing the Secretary of
State to accept all late vote tallies, the Florida court
"virtually eliminated" the certification deadline and the
Secretary of State's "discretion to disregard recounts that
violate it.""' At stake was the Secretary's power to make
final decisions concerning disputed ballots. By adopting the
"intent of the voter" standard and extending the deadline
for certification, the Florida Supreme Court had shifted
power from the Secretary of State to the counties and to
county canvassing boards-from the state to its localities.
This is certainly a radical departure from a state legislative
scheme if local governments are instrumentalities of the
state and the county canvassing boards are simply agents of
the Florida Secretary of State and through her, the Florida
legislature.
The Florida Supreme Court, in contrast, had adopted
something of a localist position, by reading the state
legislative scheme to carve out a sphere of authority for
county canvassing boards to determine disputed ballots for
themselves. The Florida Supreme Court based this reading
on prior cases, and on a state constitutional mandate to
credit as many ballots as possible,8" but it could also have
invoked the Florida Constitution's "home rule" provisions.
Florida is a home rule state rather than a Dillon's Rule
state: Under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Florida
Constitution, Florida grants to its counties all powers of
government not specifically excepted by law.84 Exercise of
the government's police power on behalf of the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizenry is included in the "broad
home rule powers" granted to counties.85
80. Id. at 118, 120 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.01 (1) (West Supp. 2001)).
81. Id. at 120.
82. Id.
83. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1230-38
(Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000).
84. FLA. CONST., art VIII, § 1; see also City of Boca Raton v. Florida, 595 So.
2d 25, 26-28 (Fla. 1992); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach
County v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 142-43
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
85. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1983);
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Rehnquist's Article II argument, however, appears to
trump any grant of local authority-protected by state
constitutions or otherwise. For Rehnquist, it was sufficient
that the Secretary disagreed with the canvassing boards
and that the State was pitted against the counties. On the
Chief Justice's interpretation of Florida law, the Secretary
of State was the only official in the system permitted to
exercise significant discretion. In light of the obvious
subordinate position of local boards, the Court was required
to affirm this clear statutory grant of authority to the state
official.
In other words, Article II embodies a federalism
principle as against power asserted from above or from
below. As Rehnquist observed: "This inquiry does not imply
disrespect for state courts"-or, by extension, county
canvassing boards-"but rather a respect for the
86 This
constitutionally proscribed role of state legislatures."
is state legislative supremacy taken to the extreme. Under
a statutory scheme that appeared to make a state official
the final arbiter of vote tallies, Article II was essentially
read as a Dillon's Rule for federal elections: the state
legislature's grant of power to county canvassing boards
was to be strictly and narrowly construed. The Florida
Supreme Court's decision in favor of the county canvassing
boards as against state officials contravened this
requirement.
Indeed, plenary state control of its own localities is the
essence of federalism. Attention to states' rights does not
translate into protection of local power; it translates into
whatever the state wants local power to be. Thus,
Rehnquist's Article II argument is entirely consistent with,
and indeed emblematic of, the Court's federalism
jurisprudence, which has been deployed to defend
traditional state prerogatives, one of the most central being
state plenary authority over its own political units.
In this way, the federalism of the Rehnquist Court is a
defensive program animated by fear of the federal
government, as opposed to a positive program animated by
an affirmative belief in the good of small-scale decentralized
government. States are simply not small-scale decensee also Florida v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3-5 (Fla. 1994); Speer v.
Olson, 367 So. 2d 207, 210-11 (Fla. 1978).
86. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

422

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

tralized governments. No one can seriously contend that
California, with a population of over thirty million, or even
Rhode Island, with a population of over one million, are
appropriately scaled to obtain the benefits of truly local
governance. And certainly Florida, with its sixty-seven
counties, and a population of over fifteen million over a
territory of 53,927 square miles, cannot be considered a
small-scale government. Alexander Hamilton made this
point in responding to the Anti-Federalist's argument that
the nation would be too vast to foster the civic virtue
necessary to maintain a republic, observing that the states
were already too large for that kind of civic engagement.87
Though advocates of "states' rights" often invoke the
advantages of diversity, local knowledge, accountability,
and participation when defending state power,"8 the cry of
local control as an affirmative justification for limiting
federal power is misplaced.89
Again, the confusion stems from a failure to distinguish
state from local government, to separate out the
constitutionally-embedded principle of federalism with the
constitutionally-malleable principle of localism. This
confusion is evident when advocates of federalism extol the
benefits of inter-state competition by pointing out-for
instance-that "[i]nhabitants of San Francisco simply have
different preferences and needs from those in Dubuque." °
The sentence would be much less convincing if San
Francisco were replaced by "California" and Dubuque were
replaced by "Iowa," because-though arguably California
and Iowa have different characteristics-there are likely
87. See THE

FEDERALIST

No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).

88. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The
Supreme Court's New Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002); see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L.
REV. 317, 402-04 (1997) (collecting arguments); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism
and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REV. 2180
(1998) (same).
89. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes of a
NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915-21 (1994).
90. McGinnis, supra note 88. The rest of that sentence reads: "and uniform
rules that fail to take account of this diversity will leave them alienated from
their government." Id. McGinnis, in particular, conflates localism and
federalism, lumping them together in an overarching "Tocquevillian"
jurisprudence of decentralization, which he attributes to the Rehnquist Court.
It turns out that the Chief Justice is not all that enamored of local government
independence. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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substate communities in both states that share affinities
with San Francisco and Dubuque.9 As Richard Briffault
observes, "[c]ontemporary federalism discourse often
sweeps local autonomy in its ambit, vindicating the states
in terms more applicable to local governments."92
Federalism often appears to be a short-hand for "state and
local governments,"' "states and their substate local
governments,"94 the "autonomy of the political processes of
local governments"95 or "federalism and the more encompassing principle of subsidiarity."96 Take away substate
local governments, or the principle of subsidiarity, and
what you have left are large polities known as states. Adopt
only the principle of subsidiarity and most states look as
inhospitable to the alleged benefits of small-scale governance as does the federal government.97
Certainly, maintaining some form of state power as
against federal interference might be valuable for reasons
that are not directly related to the benefits of small-scale
governance. For example, states-however vast-may still
be valuable sites for experiment and innovation.98 It may be
that the mere existence of two levels of government
enhances citizens' ability to access government by providing
more than one "layer of government to which [they] may
appeal," " or that the fact of independent state government
91. Arguably, these characteristics have more to do with regionaldifferences
in geography, climate, and population density than with the particular values
or policy-preferences of "Californians" and "Iowans." If the 2000 presidential
election is any indication, the significant divides in this country seem to be
regional-between the interior and the coasts-and between urban, rural, and
suburban communities. See The Count and the Map, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000,
at A26.
92. Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism?" Normative and Formal
Concerns in ContemporaryFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994).
93. Friedman, supra note 88, at 400.
94. Id. at 389.
95. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof
FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 404; see id. at 402-08.
96. McGinnis, supra note 88. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 56768 (1995) (arguing that the Court has a role in policing the line "between what
is truly national and what is truly local").
97. See Briffault, supra note 92, at 1303-35. Cf FISCHEL, supra note 48, at
52-54 (describing why states are not appropriately scaled for effective interjurisdictional competition).
98. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-3 (1982); McConnell, supra note 73, at 1498.
99. Jackson, supra note 88, at 2214.
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serves as a "structural" check on the national government's
aggrandizing tendencies."' It has also been suggested that
state political communities can promote intermediate civic
identities that may help transcend more parochial attachments to one's ethnic, racial, or religious community.' And
finally, it may be that our fear of the federal government is
justified, and that one of the more effective ways to protect
individual rights is by diffusing power through a federalist
regime."2
Significantly, these alleged benefits of federalism could
easily lead one to embrace localism as well (even putting
aside the advantages of small scale), on the argument that
if two layers of government is good, three or more layers of
government is better.' This is not a step, however, that a
Court seeking to limit federal power in the name of state
authority would be willing to take.0 A constitutional value
of localism is certainly inconsistent with state plenary
authority over its political subdivisions. 15 Moreover, it is
often inconsistent with limitations on federal power. °6 In
other words-for all their affinities-localism and
federalism are ultimately irreconcilable.
B. Federal Power and Local Autonomy
The error in equating local independence with limited
federal power is that there is no necessary relationship
between the exercise of federal or state power and the
fostering of local autonomy. Federal power is not
necessarily more hostile to local autonomy than state
100. See id. at 2219 (collecting arguments).
101. See id. at 2220-24; cf Mark Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 4
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329 (1996) (arguing that federalism may serve to
retard a polity, providing the time required for a Rawlsian overlapping
consensus to develop).
102. See Friedman, supra note 88, at 402-04.
103. Indeed, at least one of the supposed benefits of federalism-interjurisdictional competition for citizens and firms-is one of the central
justifications for municipal autonomy. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
104. As Richard Briffault states, "the ultimate irony could be that normative
federalism will provide a weapon for national attacks on state autonomy in the
name of local democracy, rather than constitute a shield for the states' defense
against federal intrusions." Briffault, supra note 92, at 1317.
105. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 89, at 919-21.
106. See Briffault, supra note 92, at 1304; infra Part II.C.
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power, nor is state power necessarily more attentive to local
authority. °7 For example, the federal government can
empower local entities directly, and the Supremacy Clause
permits this type of congressional activity even in the face
of contrary state commands. Take for instance a case such
as City of Davenport v. Three-Fifths of an Acre of Land.10 8 In
Davenport, Congress had, through a specific act, conferred
the power of eminent domain on a city for purposes of
constructing a bridge. °9 The City of Moline challenged the
condemnation, asserting that Davenport did not have the
power to condemn state land under Illinois law and that the
Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from authorizing
one city to condemn the land of the state or another
political subdivision of the state." The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected those contentions, noting that
Congress was well within its authority to grant local
governments power to carry out the legitimate purpose of
building a bridge, regardless of state law."'
Federal preemption of state laws can also be a source of
municipal autonomy. In Lawrence County v. LeadDeadwood School District, the Supreme Court also
interpreted federal commands as bypassing state wishes to
the contrary."' In Lawrence County, the Court held that the
Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, which compensated local
governments for the loss of tax revenues from the taximmune status of federal land and permitted the locality to
"use the payment for any governmental purpose,"
preempted a South Dakota statute that required that
localities distribute federal payments in the same way they
distribute general tax revenues.' Lawrence County had
allocated 60% of its general tax revenues to its school
districts, and the school districts therefore sought 60% of

107. Cf id. at 1316 ("[F]ederalism and localism are not inevitable allies, and
states and local governments frequently come into conflict.")
108. 252 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1958).
109. Id. at 356.
110. Id. at 355.
111. Id. at 356; see also Wash. Dep't of Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 207
F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding that the City of Tacoma's federal license
to build a dam pursuant to the authority of the Federal Power Commission
preempted Washington state law barring construction of the dam), affd sub
nom. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 340 (1958).
112. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
113. Id. at 258.
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the federal payment pursuant to South Dakota law.14 The
Court struck down the state law as invalid under the
Supremacy Clause, upholding the county's discretion as
authorized by federal law."1 Consistent with his view of
state legislative supremacy, Justice Rehnquist dissented,
citing the Hunter doctrine of local subordination.116
Nothing prevents the federal government from
affirmatively conferring specific powers on local governments and insulating them from state interference." 7
Common examples are direct federal grants-in-aid to cities,
a funding scheme that bypasses states altogether.11
General federal statutes may also benefit localities and
allow them to better coordinate their independent activities.
Federalism decisions that override such laws in deference
to state sovereignty do not necessarily enhance local
authority, control, or power.
Consider the federal gun registration provision struck
down in Printz v. United States on the grounds that it
"commandeered" state officials in the service of federal ends
in violation of the Tenth Amendment.119 While considered a
victory for "local" autonomy, it is not clear as a practical or
conceptual matter that localities benefited from the
decision. For example, the Conference of Mayors supported
the federal legislation because it complemented city efforts
to combat crime; as a practical matter city power to control
gun violence was enhanced by federal coordination. 20 More
important, as a conceptual matter, Printz fully embraced
the Hunter doctrine of local invisibility: counties and county
114. Id. at 259.
115. Id. at 270; see also Wash. Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 396.
116. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 273 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); see also
supra Part II.A.
117. See Wash. Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 396; see also Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local
Officials from State Legislatures'Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999).
118. See also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 89, at 916 ("As an empirical
matter, support for urban planning generally, or for specific city functions such
as schools or police, has often come from the federal government, not from the
states."). Professor Hills argues that courts should adopt a presumption of
institutional autonomy that maximizes the ability of local governmental
institutions to spend federal revenue free from state legislative supervision. See
Hills, supra note 117, at 1284-85.
119. 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997).
120. See Brief of Amici Curiae Handgun Control, Inc., Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence, U.S. Conference of Mayors, et al., Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503).

2002] RECLAIMING THE CANVASSING BOARD

427

officials are treated solely as instrumentalities of the state.
Though county officials-local sheriffs-were the petitioners
in Printz, the Court considered them agents of the state for
purposes of the Tenth Amendment. The provisions of the
Brady Bill that required local action were objectionable
because
they
amounted
to
an
unconstitutional
"commandeering" of state officials. 2 ' The Court was not
concerned with local power or autonomy except as it
followed from state power and autonomy. The Tenth
Amendment was thus read-just like Rehnquist's Article
II-as carving out a sphere of state autonomy immune from
challenge from above or from below. Printz is a good
example of the double-edged nature of state supremacy.
Local "autonomy" is whatever the state wants it to be
regardless of the wishes or desires of local political units.
Simply put, protecting states from federal interference
does not necessarily translate into "local" power. Indeed,
the application of federal constitutional norms may
sometimes be used to immunize local decisions from
contrary state commands. For example, the Equal
Protection Clause may be a potent source of "local
authority" where the state seeks to override local antidiscrimination or anti-integration efforts.'22 In Seattle
School DistrictNo. 1 v. Washington, several school districts
challenged a statewide measure that prevented them from
implementing race-based school assignment plans in an
effort to remedy segregation.'23 The Supreme Court struck
down the state-wide initiative on grounds that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause, thus vindicating local power to
pursue particular desegregation remedies.2
Romer v. Evans, in which the Supreme Court struck
down a Colorado state constitutional referendum that
voided local attempts to enact measures protecting gays

121. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (referring to the county officials as "State's
officers"); see also Hills, supra note 117, at 1212-14 (discussing Printz and its
version of state legislative supremacy).
122. Local African-American communities certainly benefited from federal
intervention when recalcitrant states resisted integration during the Civil
Rights era.
123. 458 U.S. 457, 461-64 (1982).
124. Id. at 470-71, 487; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S 33 (1990)
(holding that state constitutional limit on local tax rates could not be imposed
on school district that was required to raise taxes to comply with federal
desegregation remedies).
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and lesbians from discrimination, 25 has also been read as
vindicating local autonomy in the face of state objections."'
It is telling that Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer-joined
by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas-invoked the
Madisonian argument for local distrust.'27 Scalia argued
that the local governments in which pro-homosexual
olicies had been adopted (Aspen, Boulder, and Denver)
ad been captured by a well-organized minority factiongays and lesbians. Because gays and lesbians "tend to
reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities,
have high disposable

income,

and

.

.

.

care

about

homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the
public at large, they possess political power much greater
than their numbers, both locally and statewide."8 The
antidote is both classically Madisonian and consistent with
federalist (but certainly not localist) principles: move
decision-making up to the state level, the implicit claim
being that state legislative or constitutional processes are
more democratic, representative, and fair than are local
ones.
These cases do not illustrate that federal power is
always a source of local autonomy, but only that the federal
government can be a source of local power rather than a
threat to it. Of course, federal constitutional values can
often be used to override local norms as well. The Bush v.
Gore majority's use of the Equal Protection Clause is an
example. And yet, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
shows that federalism and overriding local norms often go
hand in hand. By elevating the Florida Legislature above
the Florida Supreme Court and by giving the Florida
Secretary of State the final word over the county
canvassing boards, the Court effectively pitted state power
against local power, federalism against localism. It is no
surprise that federalism won. 9
125. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
126. See Barron, supra note 43, at 599. But cf Richard Ford, Law's Territory
(A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 922-27 (1999) (arguing that
local autonomy can also be a prison for minority groups, who may only gain
protections if they can control local political processes in often insular enclaves).
Romer is, of course, a notoriously opaque decision.
127. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); text
accompanying notes 33-38.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Cf. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 273
(1985) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (arguing that the Court's reasoning is "simply
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All of which is to say that the equation of federalism
with either local tyranny or local autonomy is misplaced. A
substantive localism would require that states defer to local
norms, and further, that federal courts can and should
enforce local "immunity" from state interference under
certain circumstances. In Bush v Gore, that would mean
that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion carving out a
sphere of authority for county canvassing boards as against
contrary state instructions would not just be entitled to
federal deference as a matter of comity or general
federalism principles, but would instead have an
affirmative constitutional basis.
III. SELF-GOVERNMENT

The argument that local governments are constitutional
actors with affirmative and formal roles to play in the
constitutional scheme is not without pedigree. Carol Rose
has traced the tradition of modern localism back through
the Anti-Federalists to
what J.G.A. Pocock has called the
"ancient constitution"13 -the spiritual forebear of current
forms of civic republicanism. David Barron has more
recently advocated a version of "local constitutionalism,"
derived in part from the thought of Thomas Cooley, a
prominent nineteenth century constitutional theorist, who
advocated judicial
protection of local government
independence from state interference."' Other commentators have also recently suggested that localism take on a
more prominent place in constitutional doctrine. Thus, Dan
Kahan and Tracey Meares have argued that certain
constitutional provisions (particularly those dealing with
street law) be read in light of local circumstances, and that
levels of constitutional scrutiny be adjusted to accommodate
neighborhood norms or laws that are crucial to the survival
not convincing in the light of the long history of treatment of counties as being
by law totally subordinate to the States which have created them").
130. See Rose, supra note 37, at 75.
131. See Barron, supra note 43, at 488-96. Barron understands localities as
important institutions in "checking the arbitrary tendencies of public power."
Id. at 520. According to Barron, "local communities are peculiarly positioned to
determine the scope of their positive constitutional obligations," and therefore
should be enabled to enforce under-enforced constitutional norms-those
constitutional norms that are not susceptible of direct judicial enforcement. Id.
at 598.
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of unique substate communities.132 Mark Rosen has
suggested that the Constitution be interpreted to allow for
wider variations in local norms, arguing that liberalism
requires that the wider society accommodate the lawmaking of discrete, territorially-defined local communities.'
Localism, on these accounts, is protective of
particular-often insular-communities of common interest
whose values are worthy of constitutional protection. 34
These versions of local power present tremendous
difficulties in application. The line drawing problems
inherent in defining the appropriate self-governing
community and delineating limiting principles that a court
can apply in deciding the ultimate contours of local
authority have always stymied judicial efforts to carve out
"spheres" of local competence." But even putting those
difficulties aside, these various "local constitutionalisms"
are somewhat limited in application. Local power can be
defined and cabined when it is exercised in separatist
enclaves, but what happens when it is exercised as it most
often is, by municipal corporations operating the machinery
of government on a day-to-day basis? The test of local
constitutionalism is not whether insular or unique minority
communities' differing norms can be accommodated.
132. See Dan Kahan & Tracey Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1173 (1998); Dan Kahan & Tracey Meares, The
Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197 (1998) [hereinafter Critique of Morales]. I have
criticized these efforts elsewhere. See Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of
Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001).
133. See Mark Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical
Variations of ConstitutionalRequirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1129 (1999).
134. For example, Kahan and Meares argue that courts should defer to the
law-making of minority residents of inner-city Chicago, who share a "linked
fate." Critique of Morales, supra note 132, at 209-10. Abner Greene makes a
related argument in the context of the Establishment Clause. See Abner S.
Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1996).
135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992) (noting that
"municipal affair" and "statewide concern" are legal conclusions rather than
factual descriptions); cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985) (holding that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of traditional governmental function is unworkable, and
that the limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers is a question to be
resolved by the political process). I am skeptical of efforts to ground local
autonomy in territorial and sociological conceptions of community. See
Schragger, supra note 132.
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Rather, the real test is whether the existing institutions of
local government to which we all belong (towns, counties,
townships, cities) can be taken seriously as components of
our national democratic practice. Should local institutions
like counties and county canvassing boards be part of the
national constitutional conversation when the stakes are
quite high?
A. DemocraticLegitimacy
Remember that the Florida counties and their
canvassing boards were relatively powerless institutionsalmost ministerial in function-until what they did
mattered. Bush v. Gore underscores how powerful a
"powerless" entity can become when the spillover effects of
local decisions are significant. In this instance, the spillover
effect of a local decision either to count or not to count
ballots with hanging or dimpled chads might have been the
election of the President of the United States."6 It is here
that the local norm has national implications; an
insignificant authority to count ballots becomes a
significant power potentially to alter the outcome of a
presidential election. One may not be prepared to allow
local communities that much power, and it is not clear that
one should. The difficulty is determining which powers are
appropriately "local" and which are appropriately "general"
when that choice will have clearly defined winners and
losers.
The issue is not the size of government-"big" versus
"small" government is a shibboleth-but rather its
legitimacy. How can an unavoidably and necessarily largescale and diverse society made up of hundreds of millions of
"citizens" make democratically acceptable decisions about
how to govern itself? Consider recent concerns among
political and legal theorists about the current state of civil
136. Of course, no one can know what the outcome would have been had the
recounts been allowed to continue. Recent reviews of the Florida ballots by
independent media indicate, however, that the outcome of the election would
not have changed had the canvassing boards been permitted to count the
specific ballots challenged by the Gore campaign, though the study also found
that the outcome may have been different had all undercounted ballots
throughout the state been recounted. Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Study
of Disputed FloridaBallots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al.
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society."' Scholars are increasingly attentive to participatory and/or deliberative values, animated by a fear that
democratic institutions cannot long survive if citizens are
not speaking to one another or if the quality of their
discourse is debased.13 Indeed, constitutional theory has
become somewhat preoccupied with deliberative values. 39
Theorists find in communicative practices a mechanism for
justifying the exercise of collective political power, for

grounding the legitimacy of constitutional norms and
government action. 4 1 "Discourse" has become a popular
137. See, e.g., COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA

(E.J. Dionne, Jr., ed., 1998); CIvIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CiviC RENEWAL
(Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL
16 (1995); NAT'L COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How
CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT

(1998), at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/Affiliates/CivicRenewal/finalreport/table_
ofcontentsfinal-report.htm. A number of law reviews have recently hosted
symposia addressing issues surrounding civil society. See Symposium, The
Constitution and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569 (2001);
Symposium on Legal and ConstitutionalImplications of the Calls to Revive Civil
Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (2000); Symposium, Trust Relationships, 81
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2001). For a critique of "civil society revivalism," see Linda
McClain & James Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society Revivalists, 75 CHIKENT L. REV. 301 (2000).
138. This diverse group is unified by the belief that self-government must be
restored by "facilitating people's active participation in the governmental
process." Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711,
731-32 (2001) (collecting sources). Works that arguably fall within this category
include CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do
(2001); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE (1984); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996); AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
BOHMAN, DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRACY (1996).

(1996);

JAMES

139. As Miriam Galston points out, legal scholars as diverse as Bruce
Ackerman, Mark Tushnet, Robin West, Frank Michelman, Suzanna Sherry, and
Cass Sunstein all share an interest in deliberative accounts of public
constitutional decision-making. Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously:
Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative
Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 331, 334-35 (1994).
140. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 4-10 (2000).
Young argues:
On the deliberative model, democracy is a form of practical reason.
Democratic process is primarily a discussion of problems, conflicts,
claims of need or interest. Through dialogue others test and challenge
these proposals and arguments. Because they have not stood up to
dialogic examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines some
proposals. Participants arrive at a decision not by determining which
preferences have greatest numerical support, but by determining

2002]

RECLAIMING THE CANVASSING BOARD

433

proceduralist solution to the problem of conflicting
fundamental values, a way of domesticating and guiding
democracy when it is faced with fundamental moral
disagreements about public policy.141
Yet, scholars of deliberation rarely mention local
institutions as sites of legitimation. Perhaps this is because
when theorists talk about deliberation or participation they
are often referring to deliberation in a national institution
(other than the Supreme Court) or to the mobilization of the
undifferentiated mass known as "the People.' 42 Participatory accounts often refer to popular political energy in the
abstract without pausing to consider how self-government
already happens in local institutions. Again, much of this
abstraction is a result of the emphasis on a nationalized
constitutional dialogue. 44 Perhaps the local planning or
school boards, the sewer committee, and the canvassing
boards are, by themselves, inadequate to the distinctly
national task of formulating constitutional values, and may
even be theoretically incapable of doing so, not being
representative of "the People" except in the most symbolic
sense.
I suggest the opposite. What about the institutional,
political, and moral weight of county canvassing boards?
Consider the argument that the ultimate conclusion of the
contest for the presidency in 2000 would have been most
legitimate if it had been resolved by "local citizens" engaged
in the ordinary institutional practices of local governance.
This argument sounds appealing, and yet it is likely that
when asked to choose among all the possible institutions
that could have resolved the 2000 election-the county
canvassing boards, the U.S. Congress, the Florida state
which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best
reasons.
Id. at 10.
141. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 138; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 138, at 1-9, 11-51.
142. Claims that "the People" can mobilize to create constitutional
meaning-usually through some kind of national institution-are in the
mainstream of legal academia. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS

6-7 (1991).

143. See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE (1994).
144. See Robert F. Nagel, Nationalized Political Discourse, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2057, 2058-59 (2001); cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 138 (adopting a deliberative
account of American constitutionalism that discusses how national institutions
like the Supreme Court should do their work).
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legislature, the Florida state courts, and the U.S. Supreme
Court-most commentators and citizens would put the
county canvassing boards last.
Granted, one might come to this conclusion not because
of one's general distrust of local government, but rather
because of one's doubts about the particular institutional
composition of the canvassing boards. The Florida
canvassing boards were made up of local government
officials-a judge, a county commissioner, and the local
supervisor of elections-and one could argue that these
officials were not competent to speak on our behalf or would
have acted venally if permitted to do so. Perhaps the
respect we might have for the jury (recall Stevens's
analogy)-an institution arguably staffed by "ordinary
people"--does not extend to the canvassing boards-an
institution staffed by politicians and government officials.
But one could also make the opposite claim-that these
local officials were particularly well suited to count our
ballots, particularly when it was their job to do so and
particularly when compared to the alternatives-some
collection of unelected judges, the Florida state legislature,
or Congress. Certainly county-level officials are more likely
to be our neighbors (and look more like our neighbors) than
members of Congress, federal judges, U.S. and State
Supreme Court Justices, or even state representatives. And
County Election Boards-composed of inspectors and clerks
who were required to be residents of the county-are
certainly more akin to "ordinary people" than federal or
state elected or appointed officials. 4 ' Consider again the
images of the numerous part-time counters-county
employees and volunteers-who came in over the weekend
to participate in the Bush v. Gore recount under the
supervision of county canvassing boards.
Indeed, one could argue that canvassing boards, rather
than state or national entities, should determine the "intent
of the voter" because that decision should be made by the
145. It is not clear which way the "ordinary people" argument cuts. Among
the political and cultural elite, of which the Supreme Court Justices are
undoubtedly members, the image of "ordinary people" doing such important
work might have been terrifying. On the Court's disdain for the vast majority of
Americans who do not share the Justices' particular class interests, see Paul D.
Carrington and H. Jefferson Powell, The Right to Self-Government after Bush v.
Gore (Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series No. 26, 2001).
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very people who voted in the community, used the same
ballot, and attended the same polling stations. The
alternative-some kind of centralized counting processmight actually result in less transparency and more
potential political manipulation or bureaucratic abuse.
Even if fair, such a process might be viewed as less
legitimate. Certainly for many of Florida's AfricanAmerican citizens (a community that is rightfully
suspicious of voter manipulation by those outside the
community), the 2000 election would have been more
legitimate had local communities been permitted to count
their own votes.
In any case, the discussion was and is worth having.
Yet, the canvassing boards never made it into the
conversation. What does it say about American democracy
when the institutions that look most like the people (or at
least that are closest to them) are not trusted with even the
most mundane tasks of democratic self-rule?
B. The Marginalizationof Local Government
The notion that a particular local institution can
occasionally speak for all of us seems quite foreign.
However, that may only be because "the People" do not see
themselves reflected in those institutions. I am pointing
here towards a cultural disposition, a way of engaging the
institutions of government and politics.'46 Perhaps Bush v.
Gore is a lagging indicator of a cultural and political
reality-a fact of social life in the United States that local
government institutions are simply not robust sites of civic
engagement.
Surely, an argument can be made along these lines. As
a start, one could point to a significant historical trend
toward centralization and globalization in the twentieth
century. The "local" has less and less relevance to
Americans living in an age of rapid communications and
transportation, where the mobility of information, persons,
146. In a related vein, Richard Pildes argues that a "cultural conservatism
toward democracy" underlies Bush v. Gore. See Pildes, supra note 7, at 716-17
(citing a series of Supreme Court opinions that indicate a judicial culture that
fears democratic tumult and favors order and structure). Pildes indicates that
this cultural disposition is "more pervasive than one confined to the current
[Supreme] Court," id. at 716, though it is not clear how pervasive he believes it
to be.
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goods, and capital makes specific jurisdictional locales
increasingly irrelevant. Over fifteen million Americans
moved across county lines in 2000, with almost seven
million crossing state lines as well. 147 The average American
often commutes over significant distances and through
numerous jurisdictions, residing in one locality, working in48
another, and spending leisure time in a third. 1
Communities are not defined predominantly by geographical space, but more often by those cultural spaces carved
out by demographics, mass markets, and cultural
production and consumption. 149 That can mean that we have
less in common with the residents of the neighborhoods on
the other side of town than with the residents of the
neighborhoods on the other side of the world.
This fact of global information and markets means that
local institutions have less control over local conditions.
National and international markets have more sustained
effects on our lives then do local ones; the price of gasoline
at the neighborhood gas station, the cost of goods at the
local Wal-Mart, or the availability of oranges in the local
grocery are mostly unrelated to local conditions and beyond
local regulatory control. The distance between the consumer
and the supplier has become international, and government
is increasingly scaled to grapple with an outsized economic
sector that can only be understood in global terms. The
town council can do a lot about local trash pick-up, but little
about the layoffs occurring at the GM plant, and less about
OPEC's current production quotas.
These larger-scale trends assert a profound, though not
inevitable, pull toward greater scale and away from the
local. ' One could also argue that a more particular and
147. U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS

2000

SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY SUMMARY

tbl. P041, Residence 1 Year Ago for the Population 1 Year & Over-State
& County Level, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_ts=34451845210
(last visited March 17, 2002).
148. See Gerald Frug, Decentering Decentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253,
320 (1993) (noting that individuals cross local government jurisdictional lines
numerous times a day).
149. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things:
AnthropologicalApproaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLy' 791 (1995).
150. The trend toward larger scale institutions cannot be ignored, though I
do not want to overstate it. Globalism and localism can happen simultaneously,
with government both devolving downward and migrating upward. See Alan
Ehrenhalt, Demanding the Right Size Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at
TABLES
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home-grown reason for the cultural vulnerability of local
government is a pervasive consumerism that characterizes
conceptions of local governance-call it "consumerist
localism." Government services are increasingly viewed as
goods
that
consumer-voters
purchase
in
market
transactions.151 For vast numbers of Americans, the market
now provides what traditional municipal governments once
had. Private security guards outnumber public police by
three to one.15 In many cities, quasi-private agencies like
business improvement districts manage public streets,
provide security, and sanitation services. 53 The public
spaces of the town square have been replaced by the
privately managed spaces of the shopping mall.' Private
homeowners' associations are the most popular new forms
of suburban development.'
As of 1998, approximately
forty-two million Americans were living in privately
managed neighborhoods, and up to eight million lived in
gated communities.' And private schooling has become the
default option in many neighborhoods for those who can
afford it.
A27; see also Michael Geyer & Charles Bright, World History in a Global Age,
100 AM. HIST. REV. 1034, 1034-60 (1995).
151. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1998). In the
legal literature this view is associated with Charles Tiebout's A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, supra note 103, which first developed the framework for
understanding local finance as a rivalry among local governments for residents
analogous to the rivalry among firms.
152. Welcome to the New World of Private Security, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19,
1997, at 21.
153. See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business
Improvement Districtsand Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366-67 &
n.1 (1999). Briffault estimates that there are between 1000 and 2000 business
improvement districts operating in the United States. Id.
154. See Margaret Crawford, The World in a Shopping Mall, in VARIATIONS
ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE
(Michael Sorkin ed., 1992). There are over 44,000 shopping centers in the
United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, tbls. 1293 & 1294. (120th ed. 2000).
155. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the "Secession of
the Successful": Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1675, 1676 (2001) (collecting data).
156. See CLIFFORD TREESE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS FACTBOOK 3 (1999);
EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 180 n. 1 (1997).
157. As of 1998, approximately 13% of all school-age students attended
private schools. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 154, at tbls. 239 &
240.
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The result is the privatization of traditional municipal
services, a management model of the provision of public
goods.'58 The governing ethos of the market is exit:" 9 if
citizens desire a service and cannot obtain it, they take
their business elsewhere, either to a more congenial locality
or to a private provider of public services. This ability to
"opt-out" eliminates the necessity for politics-the public
formation of shared priorities and values. Exit displaces
voice as the mechanism for accommodating conflicting
preferences or dissatisfaction with a current regime. 6 ' As
numerous commentators have noted with some alarm, the
wealthy can 6and
are seceding from American society into
"privatopias"' 1-homogeneous
communities
in which
politics is barely required because all interactions are
managed and larger societal problems can be "zoned" out.
Deliberation, negotiation-the give-and-take of the political
process-are time-consuming, expensive, and unnecessary.
The sorting of Americans into communities of like
minds through the mechanism of exit may contribute to
political lethargy at the local level. Americans tend to live
in increasingly segregated neighborhoods that are easy to
describe-as "Republican" or "black" or "working class" or
"wealthy." Studies have shown that homogeneous communities have lower rates of local political involvement and
participation in voting than do communities with more
integrated populations;62 studies of homeowner associations
indicate a similar lack of civic engagement.'63 As Constance
158. This follows the professionalization of municipal government that
began in the first part of the twentieth century. Currently, most municipalities
are governed by professional managers, who are accountable to elected
municipal boards in the way CEO's are accountable to corporate boards of
directors. See FISCHEL, supra note 48, at 23.
159. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 39.
160. See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL
INCORPORATION 3 (1981).
161. Robert Reich was the first to sound the alarm about the secession of
the successful. See Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1991, §6 (Magazine), at 16. Evan McKenzie coined the term "privatopia" in
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE

GOVERNMENT (1994). See also BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 156. For an
argument that "civic secession" exacerbates inequality see Cashin, supra note
155, at 1675-78.
162. See Eric J. Oliver, The Effects of MetropolitanEconomic Segregation on
Local Civic Participation,43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186 (1999).
163. See ROBERT J.
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 140 (1992).

RESIDENTIAL
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Perrin observed in her study of suburban land use regimes
in the 1970s, the pervasive management of social spaces
unavoidably results in the atrophying of the social
competencies of the neighbor. 4

The rise of the management model of public goods (with

its emphasis on exit) has been accompanied by what
political theorists who study civic engagement have noted is
a serious decline in citizen participation in local institutions
over the past thirty-five years.'65 Robert D. Putnam, in his
oft-cited book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community, records Americans' declining
participation in politics, civic organizations and clubs, and
activities with neighbors.'66 It is difficult to assess these
claims, and there are certainly debates about what
normative conclusions should be drawn from Putnam's
data. "' 7 Undoubtedly, however, less space is available in
which "ordinary citizens" can come together to engage in
164. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND
LAND USE IN AMERICA 105-06 (1977); see also Frug, supra note 151, at 32
(discussing the consumerist model of local government services which devalues
"values commonly associated with democracy-notions of equality, of the
importance of collective deliberation and compromise, of the existence of a
public interest not reducible to personal economic concerns"). This lack of
interest in the democratic aspects of governance on the part of local residents
does not mean that local government and local government policies are not
important to them. Consumerist local government is characterized by its
defensive posture; local government's primary function is to control the flow of
people and firms into and out of the community. See Schragger, supra note 132,
at 374-75, 405-15. This is a very important task because people are quite
concerned (for a host of reasons) about who moves-in next door to them.
Participation in the decisions of the day increases dramatically when there is a
perceived threat that such in-migrants will not add to the value of the
community. This is most often thought to be the case when those in-migrants do
not "look like" or are "different" from current residents.
165. As Lawrence Lessig notes, "Like the ozone layer, a hole in social capital
has opened up in social space, and the question is why." Lawrence Lessig,
Preface to a Conference on Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 329, 332 (2001); see also
Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social
Capitalas Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1574-77 (2001).

166. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48-64 (2000). Putnam has .wondered recently whether

the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, will have the effect of increasing civic engagement to the levels seen after
the attack on Pearl Harbor. See Robert Putnam, A Better Society in a Time of
War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A19.
167. See, e.g., Paul Rich, American Voluntarism, Social Capital, and
Political Culture, 565 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (1999) (collecting
arguments).
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participatory and deliberative "governing" activities, and
less time is being spent in the spaces that do exist.
Americans appear to be spending more time in front of the
television or at the mall and less time at the planning board
meeting. Whether or not the "social capital" generated by
interactions with neighbors and fellow citizens in pursuit of
common ends is, as Benjamin Barber writes, a "necessary
basis for democratic citizenship,"'68 the social reality is that
local government is not an important civic commitment for
a large percentage of Americans.'69
This reality is reflected in a political culture that
identifies much more with national officeholders than with
the county freeholder. Ambitious and talented persons seek
the national stage where the audience is larger and the
issues are arguably more significant. A televised political
culture focuses on the politics of Congress and the
Presidency, and little on the politics of the local school
board. And that nationalized political culture has come to
be dominated by professionalized, "top-down" interest
groups, what Theda Skocpol calls "advocates without
members." 7 ° In Mark Tushnet's words, this is a
constitutional regime characterized by a "public that does
not participate in politics." 7 ' The legal culture-the culture
of law students, lawyers, and legal professionals-is also
directed to a national audience. Law schools, at least some
of whose students will end up practicing in local contexts or
advising local institutions, rarely emphasize the theory or
practice of local government law. Law students strive to
enter practice in global law firms based in global cities, and
legal academics (of which I am one) rarely bother studying
the operations of local governments and local entities, but
168.

BENJAMIN BARBER, CREATING MALL TOWN SQUARE: WHAT CAN BE DONE
PUBLIC SPACE IN AMERICA'S SUBURBS 1 (1997); see generally

TO RECREATE

BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE

(1984).
169. One notable exception appears to be the state of New Hampshire. In a
recent study of forty geographic areas across the nation, New Hampshire scored
highest in the measures of civic equality. See Tamar Lewin, One State Finds
Secret to Strong Civic Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at Al. According to
Lewin, in one town, 8% of the population serves in some civic position.
Recent
Without Members: The
Advocates
Skocpol,
170. Theda
Transformation of American Civic Life, in CMC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 461 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999).
171. Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
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spend much more of their time parsing the words of the
Supreme Court.
C. Localism and Constitutionalism
Thus, it may be that localism is a historical fact that we
have moved beyond, instead of a viable normative account
of politics. Perhaps the larger difficulty is that localism and
constitutionalism are conceptually at odds. Both rights and
democracy must transcend the parochialism of place if such
a thing as a national polity is to be possible. Indeed, it could
be argued that constitutional norms are properly the
province of a national (and not local) People. If an
institution is going to articulate those values, this
argument asserts, it has to do so for all of us.
Whether one agrees with the outcome or not, that is
what the Supreme Court arguably thought it was doing in
Bush v. Gore. In fact, many believed that the Court was the
only institution with the requisite political capital to resolve
the 2000 election,'72 though others think that any remaining
political capital the Court possessed is now irretrievably
squandered.'73 Some ask why Congress was not a more
legitimate institution for solving the dispute.'74 I wonder
why the county canvassing boards, sitting in their
gymnasiums actually counting ballots, were not.
The assertion that national democratic governance
must be grounded in local practice is commonplace, but one
that is often accompanied by-and confused with-claims
172. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, An Act of Courage; Under Rehnquist's
Leadership, the CourtDid the Right Thing, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 25, 2000, at
19.
173. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Will Election Case Do Damage to the
Judiciary?,LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at 15. But see Linda Greenhouse, The
Vote Count Omits a Verdict on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at § 4, 4.
(noting that recent polling data has shown that Bush v. Gore had "little effect
on the public's assessment of the Court").
174. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law
and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1432 (2001); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9,
at 1062. Arguments that Congress should have resolved the 2000 election
assume that after the counting in Florida there would have been competing
slates of electors. Obviously, had the county canvassing boards completed their
task of counting ballots and had they submitted a set of electors to Congress
that differed from the slate submitted by the Florida state legislature, Congress
would have had to resolve the dispute. Counts of disputed ballots undertaken
by media organizations after the fact indicate that it is unlikely that such a
dispute would have arisen. See Fessenden & Broder, supra note 136, at Al.
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for territorial sovereignty.175 The structure of constitutional
democracy with its ongoing negotiation between liberalism
and democracy is not consistent with territorial or group
exceptionalism except at the margins. One need not
embrace a localism of territorial exceptionalism, however,
to consider local governments relevant national political
actors. All that is required is a localism of recognition. This
is the notion that the legitimacy of democratic self-rule
depends on our ability to recognize ourselves in the
particular quotidian exercises of local governance that take
place a hundred times a day throughout the country-for
example, in the mundane act of counting undertaken by the
canvassing boards of South Florida.
Recall that for de Tocqueville, local government's
primary function was educative-local
institutions were the
"primary schools" of liberty.176 It is no surprise that de
Tocqueville described the jury's role in the same terms, as
"the most efficacious means of teaching [the people] how to
rule well."177 We decry the illegitimacy of a jury that seems
to have adopted and pronounced widely divergent views
from the "mainstream."178 Such departures challenge the
core idea of a collective community, the imagined belief that
we are one people, refracted through our civic institutions.
As with the jury, if we come to distrust local government,
we have in some sense come to distrust ourselves.

175. For example, the "shadow doctrine" of local government law
emphasizes the territorializing aspects of local power. See supra text
accompanying notes 47-61. Jerry Frug has offered an account of local
government that seeks to promote local democracy while rejecting the concept of
local territorial sovereignty. See Frug, supra note 148, at 254-55.
176. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 55.
177. See id. at 339 (stating that the jury "is the most energetic means of

making the people rule"); cf

JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY

250 (1994) ("the direct and raw character
of jury democracy makes it our most honest mirror").
178. The O.J. Simpson and Rodney King verdicts are two recent examples.
See, e.g., George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 101819 (1997) ("Many of those who watched the first Rodney King trial, the first
Menendez brothers trial, and the O.J. Simpson trial concluded that the jury was
wrong. Perhaps they lost some of their former faith in jury verdicts."); Lisa
Kern Griffin, "The Image We See Is Our Own": Defending the Jury's Territory at
the Heart of the Democratic Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332, 333 (1996) (book
review) ("Sensational stories, like the Simpson, King, and Menendez trials,
undermine the legitimacy of jury verdicts and call into question the
compatibility of the institution with the ideal of the rule of law.").
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
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If Bush v. Gore is understood as a failure then, it may
represent a failure of political and cultural will-the
increasing irrelevance of civic and participatory local
government as a social fact on the ground. This failure
cannot easily be remedied with changes to legal doctrine or
constitutional design. Though individual constitutional
doctrines have a significant impact on the distribution of
local power and resources, the defense of local government
has to come from a revised legal/political culture that sees
local entities as central actors in a constitutional
democracy. Indeed, Bush v. Gore illustrates that attempts
to formulate a substantive constitutional role for local
governments are destined to fail when addressed to the
Constitution and the courts. Such local constitutionalisms
are accomodationist in the strongest sense: the Court
establishes the terms for the exercise of local status and the
locality serves at the Court's sufferance. These accounts do
not solve the vulnerability of local government status, they
introduce new vulnerabilities by making the Court-a
highly centralized and hierarchical institution-the central
arbiter of local role. This is localism in name only.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that any doctrine of
local constitutionalism would have affected the outcome in
Bush v. Gore. One might suspect-not unfairly-that the
Court would have decided the way it did regardless. I do not
mean this merely as the realist objection that Bush v. Gore
is politics and not law. The vulnerability of local
government status runs far deeper. This vulnerability is a
function not only of the Court's inherent role as a
centralizing institution (even if it uses that role to
distribute powers), but also of a political culture that has
little patience for, or engagement in, the exercise of local
government. If Bush v. Gore teaches anything, it is that
national institutions-and the Supreme Court in
particular-are where we are governed." The vulnerability
179. This may explain why Bush v. Gore does not seem to have significantly
affected Americans' respect for the Court despite many commentators' claims
that the Court acted illegally. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v.
Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85
JUDICATURE 32, 33, 37 (2001); Greenhouse, supra note 173; cf Mark Tushnet,
Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearanceof the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002). Tushnet argues that the U.S. Supreme Court is free to make bold
political decisions in part because of "the acceptance in our political and legal
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status is, in other words, the

vulnerability of political power. If we trust local
institutions, if we participate and invest in them, they may
be a viable alternative to "rule by nine."18 ° The fact that we
may not trust them is not the fault of the Supreme Court. 8 '
CONCLUSION

When Joan Williams wrote sixteen years ago that the
history of local governments' legal status is "a startling
pure example of politics as black letter law," "2 she meant
that because localities have no "set place in the American
constitutional structure"'83 the status of local government
can easily be manipulated in order to constrain exercises of
power-local, state, or federal-in the furtherance of
political goals. Bush v. Gore illustrates this particular
constitutional vulnerability of local government status quite
effectively; no other recent decision by the Court has been
so soundly decried as "politics as black letter law."
But Bush v. Gore also illustrates what may be a larger
truth about democratic life in America: Local government is
simply not a political force that can counter the tendency to
let others do our governing for us. The county canvassing
boards were not our heroes, but maybe they should have
been. At least they should have had a place at the
constitutional table.

culture of a strong form of judicial supremacy," which is currently reinforced by
the politics of divided government.
180. Cf LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (1952) ("I often
wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon
laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes.
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law can save it.").
181. But cf Larry D. Kramer, Forward, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4,
13-15, 128-69 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist court has aggressively
embraced a jurisprudence of "judicial sovereignty" in the service of conservative
political ends).
182. Williams, supra note 5, at 86.
183. Id.

